The Credentials That Outlast the Contract: A 45-Day Third-Party Access Review
Most UK mid-market boards can say when a supplier engagement ended. Fewer can say when the supplier's access ended. The contract file records a termination date; the identity estate records a live account. Between those two documents sits a risk that is rarely owned by a single function and rarely tested before the next planning cycle.
With 2027 planning now in view, this is a practical review, not a cyber audit. It tests whether the organisation can evidence that contractors, suppliers and former advisers no longer hold the keys to systems, data rooms and administrative consoles after their engagement has finished.
The gap between exit and entitlement
Procurement closes the purchase order. HR closes the contractor record. IT may never have been told that the individual or firm was leaving. Each function can be individually correct and collectively exposed.
The familiar cases are not exotic. A consultant retains a guest account in the finance system because the project folder was never reassigned. A former adviser still appears in a data-room permission group because the room was archived rather than closed. A supplier's shared administrative credential remains in use because no one can attribute it to a named person. None of these requires malice to become a problem; they require only time and inattention.
Boards do not need to inspect every account. They do need to know that a reconciliation has taken place, that exceptions have named owners, and that closure evidence exists.
Four registers, one view
The review starts by bringing four records into a single working view:
- The procurement or contract register, showing supplier name, engagement dates, renewal terms and exit obligations.
- The HR and contractor register, showing named individuals, employing entity, start and end dates, and sponsor.
- The IT identity store, showing live accounts, last sign-in, authentication method and privileged roles.
- The data-room and SaaS administration consoles, showing guest access, permission groups, shared links, API tokens and file-sharing settings.
The reconciliation is by person, organisation and engagement period. It should distinguish human accounts from machine credentials, service accounts and integrations. It should also separate access that is merely present from access that is privileged, shared or capable of exporting data.
What to test, not just list
A list of accounts is not evidence of control. The review should test five questions.
First, which live accounts belong to individuals or firms with no active engagement? Second, which administrative rights are held by third parties rather than employees? Third, which shared credentials cannot be attributed to a named person? Fourth, which data-room permissions survive the closure of the project they were created for? Fifth, which supplier integrations or API tokens remain active after the contract has ended?
Answers should be recorded as exceptions with a risk rating. A dormant guest account in a low-sensitivity collaboration tool is not the same as an active administrator in the finance system or an open data room containing board papers. The board pack should show the difference.
A 45-day sequence with a single owner
Day 1 to 5: appoint an accountable owner, normally the CFO or COO, supported by IT and procurement. Agree scope, escalation route and the evidence standard. Do not let the exercise become an IT-only ticket queue.
Day 6 to 15: pull the four registers and produce the reconciliation. This is usually where the first surprises appear, because supplier records and identity records use different naming conventions.
Day 16 to 25: validate exceptions with business sponsors. Confirm whether access is still required, whether it should be reduced, or whether it should be removed immediately. Record the sponsor's decision.
Day 26 to 35: remediate. Remove dormant accounts, revoke privileged roles, rotate shared credentials, close data-room permissions and disable unused integrations. Where removal would interrupt a live service, record a time-bound exception with an owner and a closure date.
Day 36 to 45: verify and report. Sample the closed items, confirm that removal has taken effect, and produce a short board pack showing scope, exceptions, actions taken and residual risk. The pack should be signed by the accountable owner.
Evidence the board can rely on
Good evidence is modest but specific. It includes a reconciled register, a closure log with ticket references, screenshots or system reports showing removal, and a final attestation from the accountable owner. It should also identify any exceptions that remain open and the date by which they will close.
This evidence has a second use. It can be folded into the 2027 operating plan as a standing exit control: every renewal, contract termination and contractor departure should trigger an access offboarding check. Procurement can include access closure in exit clauses; HR can notify IT at the point of departure; IT can report exceptions to the accountable owner each quarter.
Questions for the next board meeting
Which third parties currently hold privileged access? Which shared credentials cannot be attributed to a named person? Which data rooms remain open after the project has closed? Who signs off access closure, and what evidence do they receive? If the board cannot answer these questions with reference to a recent reconciliation, the 45-day review is the appropriate next step.
The objective is not a perfect identity estate. It is a defensible answer to a simple question: when a supplier leaves, how does the organisation know that the keys have come back?