Reasonable Is Proven, Not Asserted: A 45-Day Fraud Prevention Readiness Review for UK Boards
Photo: Jeremy Segrott from Cardiff, Wales, UK, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons
Most boards can point to a fraud policy. Fewer can show, with dated and owned evidence, that the policy operates when a sales agent chases a target, an introducer invoices a success fee, or a manager overrides a payment control. With the failure to prevent fraud offence now part of the UK corporate landscape, that distinction matters. The statutory defence is not a document in a folder. It is a pattern of reasonable procedures, and a board should be able to prove that pattern before anyone else asks for it.
A Policy Is a Claim; a Procedure Is a Chain of Evidence
The failure to prevent fraud offence under the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 focuses boards on a practical question. If an associated person commits fraud intending to benefit the organisation, can the organisation show that it had reasonable fraud prevention procedures in place? The answer is not found in the policy's table of contents. It is found in the chain that connects risk assessment to controls, controls to training, training to oversight, and oversight to remedy.
That chain is rarely broken in one dramatic place. It usually fails at the joins. A risk assessment was approved two years ago and never refreshed after an acquisition. Due diligence on an intermediary consists of an email trail and a Companies House download. Training completion is reported at 94 per cent, but no one can show that commission-earning staff received a scenario relevant to their work. Board minutes record that a report was noted, not challenged. A whistleblowing route exists, but the reports it generates are not read alongside sales incentives or third-party payments.
For a board, the test is simple and uncomfortable: if counsel, auditors or a regulator requested the evidence on a Wednesday afternoon, what could the company produce by Friday?
Where the Chain Usually Breaks
Five areas account for most of the weakness we see in mid-market reviews.
Risk assessment. Many assessments describe fraud in general terms rather than the specific ways the business could be used. A professional services firm with commission-based introducers, a distributor with discretionary discounts and a group with acquired subsidiaries each face different exposure. A generic assessment gives the board comfort without giving it evidence.
Third-party due diligence. Associated persons are not limited to employees. Agents, intermediaries, joint venture partners and subsidiaries can bring the organisation into scope. Due diligence often exists, but it is not proportionate to risk, not refreshed, and not linked to contract approval or payment release.
Training evidence. Completion rates are not competence. Boards need to know who received what, when, and whether the content matched the decisions those people make. A finance assistant and a sales director do not need identical training, but both need evidence that they understood the controls relevant to their role.
Board oversight. Minutes that record receipt of a report are not the same as minutes that record challenge, a decision, or a requested follow-up. Oversight is a behaviour, but it leaves an evidence trail. If the trail is thin, the procedure looks ornamental.
Whistleblowing and incident response. A speak-up line is a route, not a system. Boards should be able to show how reports are triaged, investigated, escalated and used to change controls. A single unresolved report about pressure to inflate pipeline figures can matter more than a hundred posters in a reception area.
A Mid-Market Case: The Introducer File
A UK professional services group with around 480 staff had grown through acquisition and relied on commission-only sales agents for part of its revenue. Its fraud policy was approved, its whistleblowing line was live and its annual training module was mandatory. On the face of it, the board had a programme.
A mock evidence request changed the picture. The group could produce the policy and the training completion dashboard. It could not produce a current fraud risk assessment reflecting the two most recent acquisitions. Due diligence for two introducers consisted of emails and a credit check, with no record of who approved the relationship or why the commission structure was appropriate. Training completion was high, but sales agents had received the same generic module as back-office staff. Board minutes showed that a quarterly compliance report had been noted, not discussed. A whistleblowing report alleging pressure to bring forward pipeline recognition had been investigated informally and closed without a control review.
No fraud was identified. That is not the point. The board could not demonstrate that its procedures were reasonable in the areas that mattered most. The remediation was not a new policy. It was an owner, a refreshed risk assessment, a proportionate due diligence checklist for introducers, role-based training for revenue staff, a quarterly fraud dashboard and a standing board challenge log. The programme became testable.
The 45-Day Readiness Review
A 45-day sprint should be scoped as an evidence exercise, not a policy rewrite. The board appoints an executive owner and an independent reviewer. The reviewer issues a reverse evidence request on day one: not what the company has, but what it would need to prove.
Days 1 to 5: scope and request. Agree the entities, processes and third parties in scope. Issue the evidence request. Identify the responsible executive and the board committee that will receive the findings.
Days 6 to 15: risk assessment refresh. Test the existing assessment against revenue streams, third-party relationships, payment routes and acquisition activity. Run a board workshop on the two or three scenarios most likely to benefit the organisation. Record the discussion and the agreed risk appetite.
Days 16 to 25: third-party sample. Select high-risk associated persons and trace each file from onboarding to contract, payment and renewal. Test whether due diligence was proportionate, approved at the right level and refreshed when risk changed.
Days 26 to 32: training evidence. Map training to roles and decision rights. Sample assessment results and test a short scenario with staff who approve payments, discounts or commissions. Record gaps and remediation.
Days 33 to 38: whistleblowing and incidents. Walk through the speak-up route as a user would. Sample reports for triage, investigation, outcome and control change. Confirm that the board receives aggregated themes, not just a count.
Days 39 to 42: board oversight. Review minutes, dashboards and challenge logs. Test whether the board has asked for evidence, received it and followed up. Identify where oversight is recorded but not demonstrated.
Days 43 to 45: evidence pack and plan. Assemble the pack, record gaps and assign owners and dates. The output should be a short board paper with a clear conclusion: what is reasonable now, what is not yet evidenced, and what will be different in 90 days.
The Evidence Pack a Board Should Be Able to Produce
A board does not need a perfect programme. It needs a coherent one. The pack should include an approved and dated fraud risk assessment; the terms of reference for the responsible person or committee; a sample of third-party due diligence files with approvals; a training matrix linked to roles and assessment results; board and committee minutes showing challenge and follow-up; whistleblowing reports, outcomes and control changes; third-party contracts and payment approvals; an incident log with remediation; and an annual review cycle with named owners.
If any item is missing, the board should know before it is requested. The most useful test is a reverse evidence request: ask the business to prove the procedure, not describe it. Reasonable procedures are not asserted in a policy. They are evidenced in the ordinary run of decisions, and the board is the body that must be able to show it.