Who Pays the Broker? A 45-Day Board Review of Intermediated Remuneration
The gap between approval and payment
A board will usually see the insurance premium, the energy unit rate, the telecoms contract value or the pension scheme contribution. It will less often see the remuneration earned by the intermediary that arranged the transaction. That is not automatically a problem. Intermediaries provide access, technical judgement and market placement, and many are paid by the product provider rather than by the client. The control issue arises when the board cannot reconcile what was approved with what is actually being earned.
For UK mid-market firms, intermediated spend is rarely trivial. Insurance programmes, energy contracts, telecoms estates and employee benefit arrangements can each involve brokers, advisers or consultants whose remuneration is embedded in the structure rather than shown on a single invoice. When those arrangements are numerous, inherited or renewed without review, the board can lose sight of who is being paid, how much and on what basis.
This is a governance review, not a procurement campaign. The objective is not to eliminate commission. It is to establish whether remuneration is authorised, disclosed, proportionate and consistent with the service the board believes it is buying. A 45-day sprint is usually enough to produce a defensible position before the next renewal cycle.
Days 1 to 5: Build the intermediary register
Start with a register, not a spreadsheet of grievances. List every external intermediary involved in placing, advising on or managing a material arrangement. Cover insurance broking, energy brokerage, telecoms procurement advisers, pension and employee benefit consultants, and any specialist adviser retained under delegated authority.
For each entry, record the legal entity, the named relationship contact, the services provided, the contract or terms of business, the renewal date, the payment route and the internal owner. Note whether remuneration is a fee, commission, fund-based charge, retainer, success fee or a combination. Identify any sub-brokers, introducers or delegated arrangements that sit behind the main relationship.
The register should also capture authority. Which board paper, delegated limit or committee decision allowed the arrangement to be entered into? If the answer is unclear, that is a finding in itself. The register becomes the control document for the rest of the review and should be maintained after it closes.
Days 6 to 15: Request the remuneration evidence
Ask each intermediary for a written statement of total remuneration on the arrangements in scope. The request should be proportionate and specific: the basis of remuneration, the amount or rate, the payer, the payment frequency, and any contingent income linked to placement, volume, retention or profitability.
For insurance, this may include commission schedules, fee agreements and disclosure statements. For pensions and employee benefits, it may include adviser charging structures, consultancy charges and fund-based arrangements. For energy and telecoms, it may include commission per unit, per meter or per contract, plus any override or introducer payment. Where an intermediary says that disclosure is commercially sensitive, ask for the aggregate figure and the basis rather than a line-by-line breakdown.
Compare the responses with the invoices, credit notes, statements and renewal documents already held by finance. Do not rely solely on the intermediary’s summary. The review needs evidence that can be tied back to the ledger or the contract file.
Days 16 to 25: Reconcile approval with actual remuneration
Select the highest-value and most complex arrangements for testing. For each one, compare three things: what the board or delegated approver authorised, what the intermediary disclosed, and what the evidence shows is being paid. Variances should be logged, quantified and explained.
Common findings include commission that was disclosed at the outset but increased at renewal without a fresh approval; a fee arrangement that also carries commission; remuneration paid by a provider that was not identified in the board paper; and arrangements that have continued unchanged because nobody owned the renewal diary. In some cases the explanation will be benign. In others it will reveal that the board approved a service but not the economics behind it.
Use a simple reconciliation schedule: arrangement, intermediary, approved basis, disclosed basis, evidenced remuneration, variance, owner and action. That schedule is more useful to a board than a narrative report because it shows where authority and payment diverge.
Days 26 to 35: Test conflict and service value
Remuneration is only one half of the question. The other half is whether the arrangement gives the firm access to the market it expects. Ask whether the intermediary places consistently with a small panel, whether its remuneration varies materially by product or provider, and whether it receives income from any party other than the client or the product provider.
For insurance, consider claims advocacy and placement breadth. For pensions, consider whether the adviser is truly independent and how charges are explained to members. For energy and telecoms, consider whether the adviser is paid by the supplier and how that affects the options presented. The board does not need to second-guess every technical recommendation, but it should understand the incentives behind it.
This is also the point to assess service against the terms of business. If the firm is paying for account management, claims support or market reviews, the board should be able to see evidence that those services are delivered. Where they are not, the renewal conversation should include service as well as price.
Days 36 to 45: Decide, document and set the policy
By the end of the sprint, the board should be able to make three decisions. First, retain the arrangement where remuneration is disclosed, authorised and proportionate. Second, renegotiate where disclosure is incomplete or the fee and commission structure is unclear. Third, retender where the conflict or service evidence is weak.
The lasting output is a short policy: no new or renewed intermediated arrangement without a written remuneration statement; the intermediary register is updated before renewal; material variances are reported to the audit committee or finance director; and delegated authority limits are explicit. The policy should be practical enough for finance and procurement to apply without creating a parallel bureaucracy.
Where the firm decides to move to explicit fees, do not attempt a wholesale conversion in one cycle. Prioritise the arrangements where commission is least visible, where the intermediary has the greatest discretion, or where the renewal date is closest. A staged transition, agreed with the intermediary and documented in the terms of business, is usually more credible than a sudden change of model.
The renewal calendar is the real deadline
A 45-day review is only useful if it lands before decisions are made. Map the outputs against the renewal calendar and assign owners for each action. If a major renewal falls inside the sprint, treat it as a live test case rather than waiting for the final report.
The board does not need to see every commission line. It does need to know that somebody has reconciled the intermediary’s remuneration with the authority it granted. That is the difference between delegation and drift.